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Abstract—Many users find current smartphone authentication
methods (PINs, swipe patterns) to be burdensome, leading them
to weaken or disable the authentication. Although some phones
support methods to ease the burden (such as fingerprint readers),
these methods require active participation by the user and do
not verify the user’s identity after the phone is unlocked. We
propose CSAW, a continuous smartphone authentication method
that leverages wristbands to verify that the phone is in the
hands of its owner. In CSAW, users wear a wristband (a
smartwatch or a fitness band) with built-in motion sensors, and
by comparing the wristband’s motion with the phone’s motion,
CSAW continuously produces a score indicating its confidence
that the person holding (and using) the phone is the person
wearing the wristband. This score provides the foundation for
a wide range of authentication decisions (e.g., unlocking phone,
deauthentication, or limiting phone access). Through two user
studies (N = 27,11) we evaluated CSAW’s accuracy, usability, and
security. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that CSAW
was able to conduct initial authentication with over 99% accuracy
and continuous authentication with over 96.5% accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices like smartphones and tablets provide access
to a wide range of sensitive services and personal information
(email, photos, social networks, bank transactions, health
records, enterprise data, and more). An unlocked phone is
vulnerable to snoopy family, friends, co-workers, and passers-
by [1]. Smartphone authentication (i.e., unlocking) and deau-
thentication (i.e., locking) are, unfortunately, still manual
processes that users have to repeat several times each day [2],
[3]. As a result, many users trade-off security for usability by
either choosing no phone locking mechanism [4] or choosing
simple, easy-to-remember, easy-to-type, and easy-to-break
passcodes or swipe patterns [5]. Furthermore, most current
phone authentication methods provide one-time authentication
and do not support continuous authentication; loaning one’s
phone to a colleague or family member (e.g., to make a call or
play a game) typically gives them full access to all the content
in the phone and services reachable through the phone.
In this paper, we propose CSAW (Continuous Smartphone
Authentication using Wristbands), a system that allows a phone
to passively and continuously verify that the phone is literally
in the hands of its owner. CSAW (pronounced ‘seesaw’) is
Fig. 1. CSAW phone unlock mechanism: (a) picking up phone with the watch
hand unlocks the phone; (b) custom unlock screen, shown if pickup unlock
fails, gives the user an option to unlock the phone by entering passcode or by
performing a simple rotate gesture with the watch hand (as shown in c).
a fundamentally new service to applications and subsystems
on the phone, which can serve as a foundation for initial
authentication (e.g., the phone unlocks when picked up by the
owner), deauthentication (e.g., the phone locks when accessed
by someone other than the owner), limitation (e.g., the phone
allows guest access to specific apps), and delegation (e.g., the
owner can temporarily grant specific access to another person).
Figure 1 illustrates how initial authentication works in CSAW.
After initial authentication, CSAW continues to verify the user
using data from the user’s watch and the phone.
CSAW works by correlating the owner’s wrist motion with
phone motion and phone input, and continuously producing
a score indicating its confidence that the person holding (and
using) the phone is indeed the owner. The owner wears a
smartwatch or a fitness band (‘watch’, for short) with built-in
motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) and a wireless
radio (e.g., Bluetooth Low Energy) allowing it to share wrist-
motion data with the phone. Like any smartwatch or fitness
band, the watch is pre-paired with the phone and, in CSAW,
serves as an identity token for authenticating to the phone. (We
assume that the watch is indeed on the wrist of the phone
owner; the owner can authenticate to the watch using a PIN [6]
or using a biometric approach [7].)
Contribution. We present CSAW, a method for continuously
and unobtrusively quantifying confidence that a phone’s user is
the phone’s owner, leveraging the owner’s watch as an identity
token and correlating the owner’s wrist motion with the phone’s
motion and touchscreen inputs. Our evaluation shows CSAW’s
accuracy was over 99% for initial authentication and over
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96.5% for continuous authentication, with high security (low
false-positive rate) and high usability (low false-negative rate).
Although this paper focuses on smartphones, the techniques
can also be applied to tablets or other mobile devices; we use
the term phone to refer to smartphones unless otherwise noted.
Similarly, we use the term watch to refer to smartwatches,
although the CSAW capabilities could easily be met by typical
fitness bands as well. Both types of wristband devices are
becoming an everyday accessory, and CSAW adds another
benefit to wearing one such device.
II. RELATED WORK
We situate our work in the large body of ongoing research
on reducing the burden of smartphone authentication. Below
we relate our work to efforts that leverage motion sensors
in wearables for authentication to non-smartphone platforms,
efforts on phone authentication without any external device, and
efforts on phone authentication that leverage wearable devices.
Authentication using motion sensors in wrist wearables.
Lester et al. were one of the first to propose using accelerom-
eters to identify whether two devices were carried together
by the same person [8]. Building on this idea, Mayrhofer et
al. showed how to securely pair two unknown accelerometer
devices by shaking them together [9]; Cornelius et al. showed
how to verify whether two devices are on the same body but at
different locations, by leveraging the common motion during
walking [10]; and recently, Findling et al. showed how to
transfer authentication state between two devices by shaking
them together [11]. In these systems, a user has to provide some
deliberate motion (e.g., walking or shaking devices together)
for authentication, but in CSAW we explore how to leverage
motion during natural phone use for authentication.
In our earlier work, we leveraged motion sensors in a
wristband to authenticate PC users by correlating a user’s wrist
movement with the keyboard and mouse inputs [12], [13].
Acar et al. use motion sensors in a user’s wristband to capture
keystroke related information and do keystroke-based behavioral
authentication for a PC [14]. Although CSAW uses a similar
approach, CSAW focuses on smartphones, which presents new
challenges (e.g., desktops are stationary and wrist motion is
more predictable, whereas phones are mobile). These devices
have different interaction modes, and the types of correlations
that we perform in CSAW require different signal processing
and methods.
Smartphone authentication. The common non-biometric
phone authentication methods are 4-digit PIN and swipe
pattern [3], even though they can be easily stolen and
spoofed [15]–[19]. There have been several proposals for
alternate authentication methods, some better suited for certain
users than others; for example, instrumenting the back surface
of a phone for easy authentication [20], providing a short-
lived access to bypass authentication for short sessions [21],
graphical passwords [22], or combining swipe and PIN [23].
In the same vein of reducing phone authentication burden, we
propose an alternate authentication method that works best for
users who wear (or could wear) a smartwatch.
Common biometric initial authentication methods are based
on fingerprint and facial recognition [24]. Compared to these
methods, CSAW offers different trade-offs: these biometrics
do not require users to carry any additional device, but they do
require special hardware on the phone, involve an inherent
privacy trade-off and do not do continuous authentication,
whereas although CSAW requires users to wear a wrist
wearable, it does not need any special hardware on the phone,
is privacy-preserving and supports continuous authentication.
Other efforts for initial authentication involve gesture-based
approaches that leverage motion sensors in the smartphone to
capture a secret gesture. For example, Das et al. proposed a
group authentication method based a secret knock performed
on the phone, which is recognized using an accelerometer
and a microphone in the phone [25]; Yang et al. proposed
free-form gesture-based authentication, where gestures are
recognized using motion sensors in the phone [26]; and more
recently, Lee et al. proposed a behavioral biometric based
on users’ unique pickup action [27]. Although gesture-based
authentication methods do not require any special hardware on
the phone, they are highly susceptible to mimic attacks [28].
Much of prior work on continuous authentication for
smartphones has focused on biometric approaches, exploring
the use of touch gestures [29]–[32], in-air gestures [33],
touch keystrokes [34], and app usage patterns [35]. Behavioral
biometrics work well when users stick to their usual behavior,
but are error-prone when there is variability in mobile usage
or user’s mobility; some variability and mobility can be
accommodated, as Crawford and Ahmadzadeh [36] did with
walking and stationary activity for keystroke biometric, but the
approach becomes intractable given the wide range of activities
and conditions. On the other hand, if users have a fix patterned
behavior, it is easy to copy and mimic [37], [38]. Our method
is user-agnostic – not a biometric – so it is less susceptible to
variations in mobile usage and mobility; in fact, user mobility
provides us with additional data to correlate.
Riva et al. proposed “progressive authentication” (PA),
which combines multiple signals (biometric, continuity, and
possession) to determine a confidence level for a user’s au-
thenticity [39]. This metric is combined with a user-configured
protection level to determine when authentication should occur,
thus reducing the need for authentication. CSAW and PA are
actually complimentary – CSAW could be integrated in PA as
one of the modules that determine user’s authenticity.
Smartphone authentication with wearables. Much of the
smartphone authentication effort has been focused on methods
that do not involve an additional device, because carrying an
additional device is a usability burden. However, as wearable
devices are becoming common, they provide another modality
to leverage for authentication.
Vu et al. [40] and Nguyen et al. [41] proposed a user
identification method where users wear a special ring that
transmits their identity to the phone’s touchscreen, but in the
clear; so this method is suitable for personalization, but not
for secure authentication. Azimpourkivi et al. proposed using
a camera-based method where for authentication users take
a photo of one of their access tokens [42]. Frank proposed
a similar method, but the camera is in the wearable access
token [43]. These methods require the user to take a photo every
time the user wants to authenticate, which is too burdensome for
the frequent authentications that are common for smartphones.
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The closest work to CSAW is the TwistIn method proposed
by Leung et al. [44]. In this method, users wear a watch and
authenticate to their phone by twisting the forearm holding
the phone. The twist action is captured by the watch and the
phone, and then compared by the phone, using the same-action
principle used in the Shake-well-before-use system [9]. In
CSAW, we use a similar gesture as an optional action to boost
the user-verification confidence score, but in CSAW we first
aim to perform seamless initial authentication using the natural
phone pick-up action. Moreover, unlike TwistIn, CSAW can
continuously authenticate the user by leveraging natural wrist
movements during phone use.
III. INSPIRATION AND APPLICATIONS
CSAW is inspired by the fact that smartphones and tablets
are hand-held mobile devices. We interact with our phones
using our hands: we provide touchscreen input (taps and
swipes), we pick them up, we carry them around. Thus, the
phone’s motion and touchscreen inputs should correlate with
the owner’s hand movements (measured by the motion sensors
on the watch), and can be leveraged to verify that the owner is
in fact the person picking up the phone and providing input to
the phone. Indeed, CSAW can passively continue to monitor the
correlation and deauthenticate the user (lock the phone) when
the wrist motion no longer matches phone input or motion.
CSAW’s underlying goal is to provide a continuous quanti-
tative estimate of the confidence that a phone’s current user is
in fact the phone’s owner, assuming that the owner is wearing
the owner’s watch. Before we dig deeper into the specific
CSAW method in Section IV, let us look at how a mobile
device could use the CSAW confidence metric to support initial
authentication, deauthentication, limitation, and delegation.
Initial authentication (or unlocking). CSAW’s interaction
correlations can be used to implement fast initial authentication,
leveraging natural interactions that happen before the user uses
the phone; for instance, getting the phone out of her pocket
or picking up the phone from a desk. Modern smartphones
already leverage the natural pickup action to provide quick
access to notifications by automatically turning on the phone
display when the phone is picked up [45], [46]. Using the same
pickup action CSAW can authenticate a user, so she need only
press the home button (or swipe) to access the phone. CSAW
could also be combined with a fingerprint or a face reader, or
a mechanism such as Smart Lock from Android, to make a
strong multi-factor authentication system.
Deauthentication via continuous authentication. Common
authentication schemes (such as those based on PINs, swipe
patterns, or fingerprints) do not perform automatic deauthen-
tication, i.e., they authenticate the user once but then rely
on the user to deauthenticate (lock) the device. The current
common solution for deauthentication is timeouts, i.e., to lock
the device after a period of inactivity. However, choosing a
timeout duration that works across all context is difficult, since
users’ phone session times vary based on the time of the day
and context [3]. A short timeout means a user may have to
unlock their phone more often, whereas a long timeout may
make the phone vulnerable to snoopy family members, friends,
or co-workers [1], [4]. As a result, most smartphone users
manually lock their phones before putting it away [21]. With
automatic deauthentication based on CSAW there is no need
for timeouts or to manually lock the phone, but if desired,
individuals can comfortably set a long timeout, knowing that
if anyone else attempts to use their phone before the timeout,
CSAW will recognize the other user and then lock the phone.
Limitation and access management. Consider a smartphone
owner who lends her phone to a child to play games, or who
lends her phone to a friend to search the Internet for a recipe.
She may worry that app notifications could display personal
information or that the borrower may launch an app with
sensitive information. CSAW could support a notification engine
that presents app notifications only when the owner is using
the phone, or support an OS home-screen app launcher to limit
which applications can be used when a guest (non-owner) is
using the phone.
Delegation to other CSAW users. Consider again a smart-
phone owner who wants to lend her phone to a spouse or
trusted co-worker to allow them to access specific applications
(e.g., view specific photo albums) without allowing them full
access to the phone. A service based on CSAW could provide
an interface to delegate access to a trusted user, essentially,
introducing that user’s watch (and that user’s identity) to the
phone, so that the delegated user may use the owner’s phone
in the future for certain approved purposes. Although this
mechanism requires thoughtful attention to the user interface
(and such a design is outside the scope of this paper) the CSAW
system could be easily extended to support such a use case.
IV. CSAW METHOD
CSAW monitors wrist motion, phone motion, and phone
inputs so it can determine whether they are correlated and
produce a summary metric we call the confidence score, a
value between 0 and 1 that indicates CSAW’s confidence that
the user of the phone is indeed the watch-wearing owner.
Specifically, it produces fresh scores every 1-2 seconds: an
instantaneous estimate C(t) based on the latest data at time t,
and an exponentially-weighted moving average (EWMA) C(t)
that smoothes recent scores:
C(t) = (1−α)C(t)+αC(t−1) (1)
where the factor α weights the contribution of the new
confidence score. As described above, application and system
policies can use these metrics to drive authentication-related
decisions. In this section, we describe the system architecture
of CSAW and the calculations that lead it to produce this score.
Figure 2 depicts CSAW’s architecture and its modules.
CSAW receives a steady stream of motion data from the phone
and the watch, and touchscreen input data from the phone.
These data flows are segmented into windows and examined by
three modules; the grip detector determines how the user holds
the phone, Motion-to-Motion correlator (M2MC) correlates
phone and watch motion, and Motion-to-Input correlator (M2IC)
correlates watch motion and phone input. The resulting correla-
tion metrics are considered by the scoring engine that actually
computes C(t) (further discussed in Section IV-D).
Although CSAW outputs a confidence value frequently, not
all of its modules need be active continuously. When the watch
is not present, perhaps because the owner has stepped out of










Fig. 2. CSAW architecture. CSAW uses the phone’s motion data (Pm), the
watch’s motion data (Wm), and the phone’s touchscreen input data (Pi) to verify
a user. The grip detector module detects the phone grip (g) using Pm and Wm.
The M2MC module computes a correlation score (cm) based on Pm and Wm,
and the M2IC computes a correlation score (ci) based on Pi and Wm. Using the
determined grip (g) and correlations scores cm and ci, the confidence scorer
computes an instantaneous confidence score C(t) based on the most recent
data, and a moving average of the confidence score (C(t)).
modules simply output 0 (not correlated) and that drives the
confidence score C(t) to 0 (lowest confidence). When the watch
is present but the phone is experiencing no input or motion,
perhaps sitting on a table or in a bag near the owner, all the
modules can ‘rest’ (to save energy) and the confidence score
is again C(t) = 0. Indeed, CSAW calculates the correlation
between the watch motion and the phone motion/inputs only
when there is a user-phone interaction, that is, any action
by the user that provides input to the phone or changes the
phone’s position (which can be sensed by the accelerometer and
gyroscope sensors). Examples of user-phone interaction include
the user picking up her phone or sending a text message on
her phone. As soon as phone input or motion is detected, the
watch is instructed to start sending motion data to the phone,
and the correlation modules become active.
Although the figure shows two correlation modules, the
CSAW architecture is extensible; other sensor or contextual
information could be correlated or used as input to the scoring
module. Such extensions are opportunities for future research.
A. Grip detector
Phones can be used with one hand or with both hands. We
describe a grip using two characters XY, where X is the hand
holding the phone and Y is the hand providing input. The
owner can hold (or provide input) with the watch-hand (W),
the non-watch-hand (N), or with both hands (B); thus, X and
Y can each be W, N, or B. If the phone is not held in either
hand, we denote it with U (unknown). Thus, there are seven
possible grips: BB, NN, NW, WN, WW, UN, UW; Figure 3
shows three types of grips, BB, NW, and WN.
Knowing the grip during a user-phone interaction helps
CSAW use the appropriate correlation method to improve the
accuracy of the confidence score. For example, motion-to-
motion correlation is stronger when the watch and the phone
are tightly coupled (WW, WN, BB grips), but error-prone when
the watch-hand is used to provide touch inputs (NW, UW).
Using the orientation of the watch and the phone, this module
produces an output indicating the grip only when the phone
is in use. The output at time t is a two-character string g(t)
representing the grip. Among the seven grips, CSAW can detect
and support authentication for five grips (all grips except NN
NW BB WN
Fig. 3. Watch orientation in three grips (NW: non-watch-hand, watch-hand;
BB:both hands; WN: watch-hand, non-watch-hand)
and UN, where the watch is not in physical contact with the
phone).
B. Motion-to-Motion Correlator (M2MC)
The motion-to-motion correlator module compares the
watch motion with the phone motion to determine whether the
phone is held by the user wearing the watch. When the phone is
in motion or in use, this module receives two continuous streams
of motion data, from the watch (Wm) and the phone (Pm), each a
series of sensor data samples of the form (t,ax,ay,az,gx,gy,gz),
where t is the time when the sample was collected, and ax,ay,az
and gx,gy,gz are the values from accelerometer and gyroscope
sensors along their x,y,z axes respectively. The input data
streams are segmented using sliding windows of size wm with
overlap fraction om; CSAW uses om = 0.5 and wm = 1s when
the phone is locked and wm = 2s when it is unlocked. The
module outputs a correlation score cm(t) indicating how well
the two motions correlate (0≤ cm(t)≤ 1) at time t.
Features. For each segmented window, M2MC computes a
correlation feature vector Fm with 256 features from time
and frequency domains, as we explain next. We begin with
mean, standard deviation, mean value crossing rate, variation,
interquartile range, median, mean absolute deviation, skew,
kurtosis, power, energy, and peak-to-peak amplitude, each a
statistical representation of a signal. Then we compare the
two signals by computing two numbers for each of those 12
statistics – absolute difference and relative difference (ratio) –
resulting in 24 features. These features, however, compare
aggregate statistics of the two signals without examining
whether they vary the same way with time. To those 24 non-
temporal features we add eight temporal features, as follows.
Two (cross-correlation and correlation-coefficient) measure
similarity between two signals and how they vary together in
the time domain, and a third (coherence) measures similarity
and variance in the frequency domain. Five more features
select the two highest peaks in both signals and compare their
corresponding peak timestamps, amplitudes, and inter-peak
times. Thus, for any two signals we compute 32 features. Since
there are four signals (x,y,z and magnitude) each from the
accelerometer and gyroscope, the final feature vector Fm has
256 = 4×2×32 features.
To determine the correlation score, M2MC uses a model
that estimates the probability that a given feature vector Fm
represents two motions that correlate. We use a random-
forest binary classifier trained to classify a feature vector
as 0 (not correlated) or 1 (correlated). The classifier is trained
earlier (using data from a population of volunteer subjects)
to generate a universal model. For a given feature vector, the
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classifier computes probability estimates for the two labels (0
and 1); M2MC outputs the classifier’s probability estimate for
label 1 as its correlation score cm(t).
C. Motion-to-Input Correlator (M2IC)
The motion-to-input correlator module compares watch
motion with phone touch inputs to determine whether the touch
inputs are given by the owner using her watch-hand. It outputs
a correlation score ci(t) indicating how well the wrist motion
correlates with the phone input at time t, where 0≤ ci(t)≤ 1.
If there are no touch inputs, this module outputs a zero.
This module receives a stream of wrist motion data (Wm,
as above) and a stream of phone touch events (Pi) of the
form p = (t, id,x,y), where t is the time when the sample
was collected, id is the unique ID assigned by the phone OS
to identify a series of touch events performed by a single
tracker/finger, and x and y are the coordinates where the user
touched the screen. (We used a Nexus 6 Android phone in our
experiments and these values are what the Android OS reports;
another phone OS may report touch events slightly differently.)
When the phone display is on, the Android OS is constantly
sampling the touchscreen to capture touch events. A tap is
a series of touch events with the same tracking ID (id) but
different timestamp (t) and position (x,y). Similarly, a swipe
is also a series of touch events with the same id and with
different t, x, and y, but a swipe is a longer touch interaction
than tap, so it contains more samples than a tap.
We segment the input data streams (Wm and Pi) based on
touch interactions; that is, each window of data represents
exactly one touch interaction (tap or swipe). For a touch
interaction ending at time t we extract the corresponding motion
data from the watch (using the start and end time of the touch
interaction). We then compute a feature vector from the watch
data, using the same 12 standard statistics (mean, standard
deviation, mean value crossing rate, variation, interquartile
range, median, mean absolute deviation, skew, kurtosis, power,
energy, and peak-to-peak amplitude) of the accelerometer and
gyroscope magnitudes. The result is a 24-feature vector Fi.
We then use a two-tier classification approach to correlate
wrist motion with the touch input. In the first tier, we determine
whether Fi is a touch interaction (tap or swipe) using a Naive
Bayes binary classifier trained earlier using wrist-motion data
from tap and swipe touch interactions as positive labels, and
wrist-motion data from other activities (such as walking, wrist
stationary, and typing on computer) as negative labels. In the
second tier, we use an interaction-specific model to identify the
likelihood that Fi (representing the watch motion) is indeed the
touch interaction (phone input) performed by the user. (Note
that these classifiers are not subject-specific, i.e., they are not
trained for any particular user, which avoids the need for new
users to train the system before use and makes the method
resilient to changes in behavior over time or due to changes in
context.) M2IC outputs the likelihood score from the second
tier as its correlation score ci(t).
D. Confidence Scorer
This module periodically outputs the confidence score C(t)
at time t. To generate the confidence score, the module uses
cm(t) from the M2MC module, ci(t) from the M2IC module,
and g(t) from the grip module. CSAW intentionally favors
M2MC, because compared to M2IC, M2MC’s output is more
frequent and reliable as it computes correlation over more data
and does not depend on the user’s touch events. Indeed, CSAW
uses M2IC only when output of M2MC is not reliable, i.e.,
when the watch and phone are not tightly coupled (the phone
is not held with the watch-hand). In short,
C(t) =
{
ci(t) if g(t) ∈ {NW,UW}
cm(t) otherwise
The instantaneous confidence score can be too sensitive
to act on for most applications as it could result in false-
negatives – taking the watch hand away from the phone for
a few seconds may cause C(t) to drop. So this module also
outputs a moving average C(t) as in Eq. 1, to smooth out the
momentary fluctuations in the confidence score.
E. Confidence booster
CSAW can help with another important category: second-
chance actions. In situations when the confidence value derived
from natural user-phone interactions is low, the system could
ask the owner to perform some explicit actions to improve
confidence. For example, in a system using CSAW for initial
authentication, the phone might fail to unlock due to low
confidence in the M2MC correlation during a pickup maneuver.
The phone could display a notice asking the user to place the
phone in their watch hand and then quickly rotate their hand
(and phone) as shown in Figure 1; CSAW can easily correlate
this motion (as shown in the next section).
V. STUDY 1: FEASIBILITY AND SECURITY EVALUATION
The objective of this study was to capture natural user-
phone interactions such as picking up phone, checking emails,
browsing the Internet, reading news, and typing, to test
CSAW’s feasibility and security. In particular, we wanted to
know: (i) whether CSAW’s approach for initial and continuous
authentication is feasible, i.e., what is CSAW’s accuracy in
correctly identifying a user; (ii) what is CSAW’s accuracy
in detecting an adversary and how long does CSAW take to
detect an adversary; and (iii) whether our choice of correlation
features improve CSAW’s accuracy.
A. Participants
Through flyers posted across our campus, we recruited 27
participants (21 male and 6 female, 13 undergraduate and 14
graduate students) for this study. The study was approved our
by organization’s Institutional Review Board (IRB); participants
received USD 10 to participate in the study.
B. Procedure
In this study we performed two experiments: one to collect
data to evaluate CSAW’s feasibility in verifying a user, and
a second experiment to evaluate CSAW’s security against a
mimicking attack.
Experiment 1. In our experience, asking participants to simply
‘use their phone for 20 minutes’ yielded limited user-phone
interaction, as they were likely to use a limited number of apps
to pass the time. Instead, we gave participants well-defined
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tasks such as ‘read and take action (reply/delete) on 10 emails’,
‘read news for 3 minutes’, ‘Google answers for 5 questions’
or ‘type the given sentences’. We asked participants to wear
a Shimmer [47] (a wrist-wearable research device) on their
dominant hand, and we provided them with an Android phone
for the the experiment. To facilitate tasks for participants on
the provided phone, we created dummy user accounts for apps
that participants would use (Gmail, Twitter, and Flipboard),
and initialized those apps with data. We initialized Twitter and
Flipboard accounts by subscribing to some news sources; we
initialized Gmail by sending emails (sampled from the Enron
email dataset [48]) to the dummy account.
Participants took about 30-40 minutes to finish the user
study, performing the following specific tasks: (1) Pick up the
phone from the desk with grip WW, unlock it, and put it back on
the desk; (2) Do five search queries with grip BB; (3) Read and
act (reply/delete) on emails with grip WW; (4) Skim articles on
Flipboard for 3 minutes with grip NW; (5) Type given sentences
on the phone with grips WW, NW, and BB; and (6) Pick up
the phone and do a ‘rotate’ action (rotate it clockwise, and
then counter-clockwise to the starting position) with grip WW.
Each participant did about 15 minute of continuous phone
use (search, email, news, typing), and provided 5 pickup actions
and 5 rotate actions. During the experiment, we captured motion-
sensor data (accelerometer and gyroscope) at 200 Hz from the
Shimmer wristband and the phone, and also the phone touch
events (using the Android adb utility).
Experiment 2. We wanted to evaluate how well CSAW
performs against a mimicking attack and how quickly CSAW
detects a different user. Participants acted as adversaries
mimicking the victim (researcher). They were asked to mimic
the ‘pickup’ action (to test initial authentication) and use
the phone for 30 seconds (to test continuous authentication).
For the pickup task, the victim (researcher) picked up a test
phone and the adversary (participant) picked up the target
phone while mimicking and synchronizing his pickup action
with the victim’s pickup action. For the phone-use task, the
user (researcher) handed over the phone to the guest user
(participant), and the guest continued using the phone while the
user typed on a nearby computer. In order for CSAW to support
limitation or delegation, it is important to identify change in
user quickly, and this second task was designed to assess just
that. We repeated both the tasks five times with each participant.
During this experiment, we measured the researcher’s wrist
movement (using Shimmer) and target phone movement.
C. Results
We evaluate CSAW’s accuracy (Section V-C1), its security
with respect to its goals and threats (Section V-C2), and its
feasibility in an out-of-lab setting (Section VI).
1) Accuracy: Since all of our aforementioned scenarios use
the confidence score as input into an authentication policy
decision, one way to evaluate the quality of the confidence
score is to evaluate the quality of some authentication decisions.
In such decisions, a ‘positive’ decision means that the policy
decided that the user of the phone is the expected user and
access should be permitted; a ‘negative’ decision means the
opposite. A ‘false positive’ is a security failure, because it
means that an imposter is incorrectly judged to be the owner
TABLE I. FPR AND BAC ACROSS ALL SUBJECTS FOR PICKUP ACTION
AND ROTATE ACTION; MEAN (STANDARD DEVIATION).
Activity Pickup action Rotate action
FPR (%) BAC (%) FPR (%) BAC (%)
PC use 0.0 (0.0) 99.9 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) 99.6 (0.5)
Phone use 0.0 (0.0) 99.9 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) 99.6 (0.5)
Same (Pickup/Rotate) 1.7 (1.2) 99.0 (0.7) 0.9 (0.3) 99.1 (0.5)
Walking 0.0 (0.0) 99.9 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) 99.6 (0.5)
Stationary 0.0 (0.0) 99.9 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3) 99.5 (0.5)
and access is allowed. A ‘false negative’ is a usability failure,
because it means that the owner is incorrectly judged to be
an imposter and access is denied. We thus focus on the FPR,
which is the fraction of decisions that were false positives, and
the FNR, which is the fraction of decisions that were false
negatives, as our primary metrics; we want these close to zero.
From the study data, we generated positive samples (with
the watch data and the phone data from the same subject) and
negative samples (with the watch data and the phone data from
different subjects). Generating samples this way allows us to
evaluate FNR as well as FPR, but it results in an imbalanced
test dataset with a larger number of negative samples than
positive samples. So we report the accuracy using the balanced
accuracy (BAC) metric, which takes into account imbalance in
test samples [49]; we want this number to be close to one.
Initial authentication is an important use case so we begin
there. For our evaluation, we consider the simplest possible
authentication policy, which makes a new decision each time
CSAW provides a new confidence score C. This policy is a
simple threshold comparison and classifies using the immediate
confidence score: positive if C > 0.5 and negative if C ≤ 0.5.
Initial authentication. With CSAW one should be able to pick
up a phone and achieve initial authentication, so we used the
data from the ‘pickup’ task in the user study. In this scenario,
the phone is locked and sitting on a table; when a person picks
up the phone, the phone should unlock for the owner (no false
negatives) and not the imposter (no false positives). When the
phone is locked there is no input, so CSAW ignores the grip
and M2IC, and produces a confidence score from M2MC alone.
Our experiments show that balanced accuracy for M2MC was
more than 99%. The average FNR was 0.8% (± 1.0), indicating
high usability. The FPR was at or near zero, indicating high
security, but let’s look closer. Consider situations where an
imposter picks up the phone while the user is working on a PC,
using another phone, picking up another object, walking, or
stationary; Table I shows the average FPR and BAC for each
of these cases, presenting the mean and standard deviation over
a 10-fold cross validation on our dataset. In nearly every case,
there were virtually no false positives and near-perfect accuracy.
The hardest case occurred when the imposter and the user
both performed the same type of action (pickup); nonetheless,
CSAW performed well with a low FPR of 1.7% (± 1.2). For
applications where even this FPR is too high, the policy could
increase its confidence threshold to reduce FPR (with a possible
increase in FNR), or consider a series of multiple confidence
values, but a full exploration is left for future work.
Confidence booster. Although the false negative rate for
initial authentication was below 1%, every such failure is an
annoyance to the owner. As discussed in Section IV-E, CSAW
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can improve usability in such cases by asking the user to
perform a simple explicit action to boost its confidence in the
owner’s presence as the holder of the phone. We thus evaluated
CSAW’s performance for a rotate action, in which the user
holds the phone in her watch-hand and rotates her forearm so
that the watch and the phone both experience the same rotate
motion (Figure 1). We used the data from the ‘rotate’ action in
our user study, and formed the test dataset for different cases
as discussed above. Because the phone is expected to be in
the watch-hand (grip WN), this confidence booster uses only
M2MC. The average FNR from a 10-fold cross-validation was
0.2% (± 0.6) and Table I shows the average FPR and BAC
for different cases. The average FPR for the hard case (‘Same’
action, i.e., the user and the imposter both performed the rotate
action) was low: 0.9% (± 0.3). Note that this rotate action
is only required if the seamless pickup authentication (which
has 1% failure rate) fails. So the error rate when both pickup
and rotate actions fail to verify a user is negligible (less than
0.01%). Performing a rotate action takes less than 1 second,
so this can be a quicker way for the phone owner to verify
herself than entering a passcode or giving a fingerprint; if the
user is already holding the phone with her watch-hand, she
does not even have to change the phone grip.
Continuous authentication. Finally, we evaluated CSAW’s
performance for continuous authentication; in this case, the
full CSAW infrastructure is relevant (M2MC, M2IC, and the
grip detector), because the user may hold the phone in either
(or both) hands, provide input with either (or both) hands, and
switch grips during use. We drew samples from the ‘phone use’
tasks that subjects performed in our user study. In this case, the
imposter has received (or taken) the unlocked phone from the
phone owner, and attempts to continue using the phone while the
owner performs some other activity nearby. (The ‘imposter’ may
be a friend or family member, and not necessarily a malicious
stranger; recall that continuous authentication is the foundation
for limitation and delegation as well as deauthentication.)
Table II lists these other activities: the owner was stationary,
walking, using a PC, using another phone, or doing the same
task as the imposter, while being in the radio proximity of the
phone. The results show a relatively high 2-7% FPR. Keep
in mind, though, that these decisions are made once every
two seconds, so the chances are slim that an imposter can
maintain a consistent series of positive outcomes for more than
a few seconds. The average false negative rate for continuous
authentication was 2.4% (± 0.7), which appears large enough
to be unusable, but this is also produced every two seconds.
Furthermore, this result applies to the simple-minded policy
defined earlier in this section; we anticipate that a practical
policy would use the EWMA C(t) or other smoothed version of
the confidence score as the basis for its decisions. For instance,
Figure 4 shows the instantaneous confidence score C(t) for
subject S1 and EWMA C(t) with α = 0.06.
Grip detection. Knowing the grip allows CSAW to choose
the appropriate correlator module for correlation and give a
reliable confidence score; if the phone is not in the watch-hand,
then the correlation score from M2MC is meaningless. We
evaluated detection accuracies for the three grips shown in
Figure 3: BB, WN, and NW. The orientation of the phone’s
touchscreen and the watch’s face can be determined by the
z-axis component of their acceleration. To measure the watch’s
TABLE II. AVERAGE (STANDARD DEVIATION) ACROSS ALL SUBJECTS
FOR CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION; w = 4s,om = 0.5.
Activity FPR (%) BAC (%)
Stationary 1.6 (0.1) 98.0 (0.4)
Walking 1.7 (0.1) 97.9 (0.4)
PC use 1.7 (0.1) 98.0 (0.4)
Phone use 4.9 (0.3) 96.4 (0.4)
Same 7.2 (0.3) 95.2 (0.5)
All cases 1.9 (0.1) 97.8 (0.4)














Fig. 4. Instantaneous confidence score for subject S1.
relative face orientation with respect to the phone’s touchscreen,
we compute the difference of their z-axis acceleration, and use
the difference to distinguish the grips. For CSAW it is critical
to distinguish between grips NW and WN, as it uses these grips
to choose the correlation module. Using a threshold of –5, we
can distinguish between NW and WN grips in our dataset with
99.12% accuracy. Although this threshold proved accurate to
distinguish the grips used by our participants while performing
different tasks and using different apps, a larger user study will
verify how well this threshold serves as a generic threshold.
(Another approach is to build a classifier to distinguish cases.)
Sensors and Features. Recall from Section IV that M2MC
uses 256 features for motion-to-motion correlation, including
40 temporal features. We hypothesized that temporal features
are important in motion correlation to achieve low FNR and
FPR required for secure applications. Consider the ‘phone’ use
case in Table II with 200 Hz sampling rate, window size of
4 seconds, and overlap of 0.5 (which means a decision is made
every 2 seconds). Table III shows that the temporal features
clearly had a substantial impact on accuracy: the last two
rows show CSAW accuracy without and with those temporal
features. Table III also shows the accuracy when using only
magnitudes (first row), only accelerometer (second row), and
only gyroscope (third row). The fourth and bottom rows show
accuracy when using both sensors but without and with temporal
features, respectively. Temporal features substantially improved
the accuracy.
2) Security: In this section, we evaluate the quality of
CSAW to serve as a secure foundation for smartphone au-
thentication. First, though, we must consider our adversary.
Our adversary is a malicious individual with physical access to
the smartphone, a curious family member or friend, or a curious
colleague. The adversary may even be another authorized user
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TABLE III. AVERAGE FPR, FNR, AND BAC DURING CONTINUOUS
PHONE USE FOR DIFFERENT SUBSETS OF FEATURES AND SENSORS.
Features FPR (%) FNR (%) BAC (%)
Only mag. 6.2 (0.9) 4.4 (0.6) 94.7 (0.5)
Only acc. 8.1 (1.0) 2.3 (0.6) 94.8 (0.3)
Only gyr. 9.1 (1.5) 5.5 (0.9) 92.7 (0.7)
All (No temporal) 7.4 (1.1) 4.0 (0.8) 94.3 (0.6)
All (with temporal) 4.8 (0.7) 2.1 (0.7) 96.5 (0.5)
(e.g., if the phone is a shared device and each authorized user
is allowed access to only certain apps or information).
Our adversary seeks to achieve one of three related goals:
(1) Opportunistic snooping: the adversary takes the opportunity
to snoop the contents of the owner’s phone when the owner
is not near her phone; (2) Stealing credentials: the adversary
steals the owner’s credentials so he can use them to access
the owner’s device in her absence or access her accounts on
other devices or websites; and (3) Shadowing: the adversary
shadows the user so that he can gain access to her smartphone.
We assume the adversary can (i) observe (and film) the
owner when she authenticates to her phone or when she is
using her phone, (ii) collect the owner’s touch inputs to her
phone, and (iii) physically access the owner’s phone, when she
steps away leaving her phone behind.
We assume the adversary cannot (i) break the secure
communications between watch and phone, (ii) obtain the
encryption keys exchanged by the watch and the phone during
their pairing, (iii) wear and use the owner’s watch (recall
Section I), and (iv) compromise the components that CSAW
relies on to authenticate users – software and hardware on the
watch, sensors and CSAW software on the phone.
In the face of the above threats, we can now describe how
CSAW meets the following important security-related goals.
Verify the owner. CSAW can verify the individual who is
actually using the phone. CSAW continuously provides a
quantitative score regarding its confidence that the owner is
the person actually using the device, based on 1) the fact
that the owner’s watch is physically proximate (in radio range
and able to transmit wrist-movement data to the phone) and
2) the correlation between the owner’s wrist movements and
the phone’s observed motion and inputs. Unlike approaches
based purely on physical proximity, it is not sufficient for the
owner to be near the device. In Section V-C1, we show that
CSAW was highly accurate in determining whether the user
was indeed the owner, that is, with fewer than 2% false-positive
results.
Continuous. CSAW is specifically designed to continuously
provide a quantitative score regarding its confidence that the
owner is the person actually using the device, enabling the
phone’s operating system to deauthenticate the user whenever
the confidence dips below a certain threshold. Thus, CSAW can
continuously authenticate the owner when she is interacting
with her phone, and deauthenticate (lock) when anyone else
tries to use her phone.
Resilient to physical observation. In physical observation
attacks, the attacker impersonates the user after observing her
authenticate one or more times. Attacks include shoulder surfing,
filming, or thermal imaging the touchscreen [50], [51]. Since
CSAW does not require the user to enter a secret, none of these
attack methods are available to the adversary.
Resilient to mimic attacks. In mimic attacks, the adversary
gains access to the user’s smartphone when the user leaves
the smartphone unattended, and attempts to fool CSAW by
providing inputs to the phone while observing and mimicking
the user’s wrist movements. Because CSAW authenticates
a user based on phone-watch motion correlation, there is a
possibility that an adversary who can successfully mimic the
user’s watch hand movements (in real time) while picking up
or providing input to the phone can be mistakenly recognized
as the legitimate user by CSAW. In our user study we
evaluate this scenario by asking a participant (adversary)
to mimic the researcher’s (owner) wrist movements while
performing two tasks: i) picking up a locked phone (to test
initial authentication) and ii) using an unlocked phone (to
test continuous authentication). Among the 135 pickup mimic
attempts by 27 study participants, CSAW correctly identified
131 mimic attempts as true negatives (not from the user); thus,
CSAW’s FPR was 2.9% for initial authentication. In the phone-
use test, CSAW correctly identified that all participants using
the phone were not the owner, but the time varied: on average
CSAW took 2.31 (±0.68) seconds to identify that the participant
(adversary) was not the owner. Overall, CSAW is strongly
resilient against mimic attacks. Since CSAW uses PIN as the
fallback mechanism, an adversary might capture the user’s
PIN to bypass CSAW’s initial authentication, but the adversary
would be caught by CSAW’s continuous authentication and
locked out after 2-3 seconds.
VI. STUDY 2: OUT-OF-LAB EVALUATION
In our first study, CSAW proved quick, accurate, and usable
for initial and continuous authentication with an accuracy of
99% and 96.5%, respectively, in a laboratory setting. In our
second study, we sought to evaluate the feasibility of CSAW’s
initial authentication in an out-of-lab setting. The goal of this
study was to answer the questions: (a) how often do participants
use their phone in a way that CSAW might actually be useful
or how often can CSAW save the need to enter the PIN, and
(b) whether participants find CSAW useful as a phone unlock
mechanism.
A. Participants
We used internal mailing lists and snowball sampling to
recruit Android users. Eleven participants (8 male and 3 female;
6 undergraduate and 5 graduate students) enrolled in the study.
Participants were required to have an Android phone and to
use an Android watch during the study. Two of our participants
had an Android watch that they regularly used; for others we
loaned Android smartwatches for the duration of the study. The
study was approved by our organization’s IRB; participants
received USD 15 to participate in the study.
B. Procedure
To enroll in the study, participants visited our lab. After
signing the consent form, we installed the CSAW app on their
Android phone. To set up CSAW’s custom unlock, participants
had to disable their existing unlock method. We walked them
through CSAW’s settings, where they first chose a 4-digit PIN
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as their fallback unlock method (in case CSAW’s unlock failed)
and then enabled CSAW’s unlock mechanism. Participants
were told that they had to wear their Android watch during the
study, but they could wear the watch on either hand. We asked
participants to test CSAW’s unlock method during their lab visit
until they were comfortable with its use. We asked participants
to use CSAW as their unlock method during the study. We
warned participants that CSAW is a test prototype and as such
may be less secure than their existing unlock method under
certain conditions (e.g., if someone manages to kill the CSAW
app from a locked phone, they can bypass CSAW’s security).
Participants could withdraw from the study if they had any
concerns (no one did).
During the study, CSAW performed initial authentication
for users. (In this study, CSAW did not do continuous
authentication, because the study was specifically designed
to test the feasibility of initial authentication in an out-of-lab
setting.) When participants picked up their phone with their
watch hand, CSAW would automatically attempt to authenticate
and unlock the phone. When CSAW failed to unlock after
pickup (either because the phone was picked up with the non-
watch hand or a failure in CSAW), CSAW’s custom unlock
screen allowed participants to unlock the phone with a rotate
gesture (with the phone in the watch hand) or by entering
their chosen PIN; thus, if participants wanted they could ignore
CSAW and simply use PIN to unlock their phone. Every time
CSAW was successful, it saved participants from having to
enter a PIN, but when it failed, it did not add any additional
burden because participants could use a PIN as they normally
would.
The study lasted for five days for each participant, and
throughout the study, the CSAW app logged all phone and
watch motion during phone pickup and phone use, and all the
events regarding authentication (e.g., whether CSAW succeeded
in an authentication attempt, if the user chose the rotate action
or entered their chosen PIN). At the end of the study, we
conducted a semi-structured interview with the participants
where we asked them to share their experiences and fill out a
brief survey about their phone use and CSAW’s usability.
C. Result
To answer our study objective, we first analyze participants’
phone unlock data to determine how often CSAW might be
useful for initial authentication, and then present participants’
subjective feedback on the usability of CSAW.
How often CSAW might be useful. CSAW’s utility depends
on how a participant picks up her phone (e.g., with watch hand,
in which case CSAW can authenticate, vs. non-watch hand,
for which CSAW cannot authenticate). However, to determine
how participants pick up their phone, we would have to either
ask the participants to manually self-report, after every phone
pickup, how they picked up their phone or ask the participants
to carry an additional device that may automatically capture
this information. Both options significantly increase participant
burden in the study, so we decided to use the actual phone
unlock data to estimate the instances when CSAW might be
useful.
Collectively, all participants performed 2,707 phone unlocks
during the study, with 54.14 unlocks per day on average (std =
18.9). Some of the prior studies observed that people unlock
their phones on average about 40 times per day, but interact with
their phone (e.g., turn on display to see notifications without
unlocking their phone) on average about 70 per day [52]. In
our implementation of CSAW, participants had to unlock their
phone even to see notifications, which may explain the higher
number of unlocks per day. Overall, 70% of phone unlocks
were performed with CSAW (about 45% were from the pickup
gesture and 25% were from the rotate gesture); the other 30%
of unlocks were with PIN. The PIN unlock could be because
CSAW failed and the participant chose to use PIN, or because
the participant picked up the phone with their non-watch hand
and could not use CSAW to unlock the phone and used PIN
instead. As mentioned earlier, we do not have ground truth in
our data to distinguish these two cases, and moreover, the point
of this study was not to measure CSAW’s accuracy, but to gauge
how often CSAW might be useful as an initial authentication
method. And from these preliminary results, it appears CSAW
was useful for 70% of authentication attempts, i.e., saving
participants from having to enter their PIN 70% of the time.
The fraction of unlocks per day that were performed with
CSAW reduced as the study progressed (Figure 5). We believe
this trend might be due to the novelty effect or the researcher
bias, which may have caused participants to change their
behavior to make an effort to use CSAW (e.g., remembering
to use watch-hand to pick up the phone), but a few days into
the study participants reverted to their usual habit of picking
up the phone. Thus, the number of CSAW unlocks towards
the end of the study are perhaps a more correct reflection of
how useful participants found CSAW. It is encouraging that
the majority of phone unlocks per day, even on the last day of
the study, were with CSAW.
When we asked participants whether they noticed any
change in their behavior during the study, five participants
said they did: three participants reported that they switched
their watch to the hand they normally use to pick up their
phone; two participants said they did notice small changes in
their phone pickup behavior, and for one of them the change
in behavior was worth the usability benefit.
I did notice I was using my watch-hand more to
pick up the phone. I thought this is what the study
is about and this is what I am supposed to do. But
I actually found it convenient to unlock it that way
[with CSAW], and then I did not mind the change.
— 27yr, Male, Student
User feedback on CSAW. In the interviews after the study,
we asked participants questions about their phone use and their
experience using CSAW. Figure 6 shows the answers to the
Likert-scale questions in our survey. Shoulder surfing during
authentication is a concern many participants shared, and one
of the advantages of CSAW is that it is resilient to shoulder
surfing because there is no secret that is visibly entered (like
PIN or swipe) during authentication. Participants did report
feeling less concerned about shoulder surfing with CSAW.
Five participants (45%) felt CSAW was easier to use than
PIN, 3 participants (27%) felt it was equally easy, whereas
three participants said PIN was actually easier for them than
CSAW. When we probed these three participants, they said
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Fig. 5. Average percentage of unlocks per day per participant that were
performed with CSAW during the five days of the study.
Fig. 6. Participant ratings on their phone use and aspects of CSAW.
and they did not like wearing a watch, which influenced their
usability assessment of CSAW. The burden to carry a watch
was also shared by other participants who do not wear a watch.
When asked whether they would continue to use CSAW, nine
out of 11 participants were either neutral or said no; the two
participants who said they would use CSAW were participants
who already wore (before the study) Android Watch on a
daily basis. Thus, CSAW provides most usability benefit to
smartphone users who already wear a smartwatch, by adding
one more utility – authentication – to the watch. Overall, this
study provides promising preliminary evidence that CSAW will
be successful in real-world settings (at least for users who wear
a watch), but a longer study (with more participants) is required
to draw generalizable conclusions about CSAW’s usability.
VII. DISCUSSION
CSAW shows encouraging results, but there are some
limitations and opportunities for future work.
Single-handed use. In Section V-C1, we show that CSAW
performs well when the watch is worn on the hand that holds
the phone or on the hand that touches the phone screen. There
are moments, however, when the owner’s watch hand may be
uninvolved – neither holding the phone nor touching the phone;
for example, the user may wear the watch on her right hand but
use only her left hand to hold the phone and touch the screen. In
such cases, CSAW is unable to verify the owner as the user, and
would have to rely on alternative means for authentication (e.g.,
require a PIN code), or ask the user to change the phone
grip. For some users (like one of our participants) the gains in
usability may outweigh the inconvenience of minor deviations
from natural interactions caused by this issue.
Securing the smartwatch. CSAW secures the phone, but
not the watch. However, fitness bands and smartwatches are
considered personal wearable devices and are not likely to be
shared with others. Furthermore, CSAW could securely link
the watch to its owner (to prevent any unintended sharing) by
detecting when the watch is removed and requiring its owner to
authenticate to the watch (e.g., by using a PIN on the watch [6]
or using a biometric approach [7]). Alternatively, users could
log into a phone using the owner’s PIN (or other authentication
method) while wearing the watch, and thereafter CSAW can
assume that the watch wearer is the owner of the phone.
Bluetooth pairing. Some use cases (particularly access lim-
itation and delegation) require the wireless technology to
allow pairing multiple watches to multiple phones, and allow
simultaneous communications between a watch and multiple
phones. BLE 4.1 supports scatternet operation so this capability
is now becoming available. Such cases are more likely for
tablets than smartphones; we envision a user working with
multiple phones and tablets, or a school/workplace in which
tablets are shared among several users.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduce CSAW, a novel approach to
unobtrusively and continuously authenticate a smartwatch user
to her smartphone. CSAW verifies the user by correlating her
wrist motion with the phone’s motion when she is holding
the phone in her watch-hand, and with the phone’s inputs
if she is using her watch-hand to provide input. Based on
the correlation, CSAW continuously provides a confidence
score that can act as a foundation for other subsystems and
applications to verify the user and take appropriate policy
decisions. Our evaluation from an in-lab user study shows that
CSAW can authenticate users with 99% accuracy using the
simple natural phone pick-up action. During continuous phone
use, CSAW could verify the user with 96.5% accuracy every
2 seconds. In our preliminary out-of-lab study, participants
performed about 70% phone unlocks with CSAW, suggesting
that CSAW could be useful to reduce authentication burden.
CSAW is also power efficient: it draws less than 2% power
on the phone and the watch by optimizing the use of sensors.
CSAW’s confidence score can feed a variety of authentication-
decision algorithms, allowing each to be tuned to achieve high
security (very low FPR) or high usability (low FNR). Moreover,
CSAW uses hardware commonly found in most fitness bands
and smartwatches, so CSAW could be integrated into such
devices without adding hardware. Finally, CSAW could extend
to tablets and may be applicable to other kinds of handheld
devices like health devices or mobile payment handsets.
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